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Abstract: The dispute  “European  Communities  – Protection  of trademarks  and  
geographical  indications  for agricultural  products  and  foodstuffs”  that  opposes  
the  European- Union  to the  United  States  and  Australia, has  been  raised  by the  
European  regulation  concerning  the protection  of geographical  indications.  This 
dispute   has   two   important   issues.   First,   the   Panel   demonstrated   that   the  
European  regulation  did  not  comply  with  national  treatment  promulgated  by 
the  TRIPS and  the  GATT 1994  Agreements.  Second,  the  Panel  affirmed  the 
possibility  of  coexistence  between  GIs  and  identical  prior  trademarks.  This 
article considers  these  two issues  and  depicts  the  position  of the  parties  at the  
end  of   the   dispute   regarding   GIs’  protection.   The   first   part   of   this   article 
presents  the  conclusion  of  the  Panel  concerning  national  treatment  and  the  
coexistence   between  GIs   and   prior   trademark.   An  analysis  of  the   relations  
between  national  treatment  and  the international  harmonization  of the rules  on 
the  protection  of geographical  indications  is presented  in the  second  part.  This 
analysis  permits  to  establish  that  if the  Panel  findings  do  not  annihilate  the  
European   system   of   protection   of   the   geographical   indications,   the   United  
States  will find  advantageous  to  free  ride  in geographical  indications,  refusing  
to move toward  the European  system  of protection.
Key words : Geographical  indications,  Intellectual  property,  National  treatment,  
TRIPS, Dispute  settlement.
JEL codes : F13, Q17, Q18
1. Introduction
3The measures  implied  in the international  trade  dispute  European  
Communities   –   Protection   of   trademarks   and   geographical  
indications   for   agricultural   products   and   foodstuffs ,  (“GIs”   and  
“dispute  on  GIs” afterward)  arbitrated  by the  Dispute  Settlement  
Body of the World Trade  Organisation  (WTO afterward), have been  
raised  by the  European  Regulation  2081/92  of the  14 th July 1992  
(European   regulation   afterward).   This   regulation   aims   at 
protecting  geographical  indications  and  designations  of origin  for 
agricultural  products  and  foodstuffs.  On  June  1999  the  United  
States 1  (and   Australia 2  on   April   2003)   requested   consultations  
with   the   European   Communities   (EC  afterwards)   in   respect   of 
certain   aspects   of   the   European   regulation.   The   United   States  
estimated   that   those   aspects   went   against   dispositions   of   the 
GATT   1994   and   TRIPS  Agreements.   The   United   States   indeed  
contended   that   the   EC  Regulation   does   not   provide   national  
treatment   with   respect   to   GIs   and   does   not   present   enough  
protection  to pre- existing  trademarks  that  are similar  or identical 
to  European  GIs. The  consultations  didn’t  allow  to  the  parties  to 
settle   their   differences   by   themselves.   As   a   consequence,   on 
August   2003   the   United   States   and   Australia   requested   the  
Dispute  Settlement  Body to establish  a Panel 3. On March  2005  the 
Panel  report  circulated  to  Members.  Neither  party  appealed.  The 
Dispute  Settlement  Body  adopted  the  Panel  report  on  20  April 
2005.
GIs  form  a particular  category  of intellectual  property.  They  are 
defined  within  the  TRIPS Agreement  as  following:  “Geographical 
indications   are   (…)   indications   which   identify   a   good   as 
originating  in the  territory  of a Member,  or a region  or locality in 
that   territory,   where   a   given   quality,   reputation   or   other  
characteristic   of   the   good   is   essentially   attributable   to   its 
1 WT/DS174.
2 WT/DS290.
3  Colombia,  Guatemala,  India,  Mexico,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Chinese  
Taipei,   Turkey,   China,   Argentina,   Canada   and   Brazil   reserved   their  
third- party  rights.
4geographical  origin” 4. Article  22:2  of  the  TRIPS Agreement  asks  
the  Members  to provide  legal means  in order  to protect  GIs. The 
EC Regulation  that  gives rise to this dispute  is in keeping  with this 
process.   Finally   article   22:3   of   the   TRIPS  Agreement   provides  
additional  protection  for GIs for wines and  spirits.
An original  feature  of this  dispute  is that  no GI located  in a third  
country   outside   the   EC  gives   rise   to   it.   The   EC  Regulation   is 
therefore  challenged  by the  United  States  and  Australia  “as such”. 
The economic  stakes  should  not  be under- estimated  however 5. As 
an   example,   the   United   States   are   an   important   producer   of 
“American”  cheeses  as   well  as   “non  American”  ones.  Together  
with  this  statement  it is interesting  to note  on the  one  hand  that  
the  American  definitions  given  to “non  American”  cheeses  can  be 
very different  with  the  European  definitions  for the  same  cheeses  
and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  American  production  of  “non  
American”   cheeses   is   systematically   bigger   than   the   American  
production  of “American”  cheeses  since  1988  with  a growing  gap  
through  time.  Furthermore,  this  dispute  was  concomitant  to  the  
ongoing   international   negotiation   on   GIs   held   in   the   Doha  
mandate 6.  If   these   negotiations   concerns   different   issues   (the 
creation  of  a multilateral  register  for  wines  and  spirits  and  the 
extension   of   the   higher   level   of   protection   beyond   wines   and  
spirits)  they  form  the  arena  for  strong  oppositions  between  the  
United   States   and   the   European   Union   that   have   different  
conception  of  the  legal  means  to  protect  GIs7  as  well as  of  the 
adequate  degree  of protection 8. It is interesting  to note  from  this 
4 Article 22:1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
5 For the economic  perspectives  of GIs see Barjolle and  Sylvander  (2002) 
for example.
6 See Addor  and  Grazioli (2002).
7  This   does   not   mean   the   American   agriculture   has   no   interest   in 
developing  GIs. See Babcock (2003) on this point.
8  The  international  debates  on  intellectual  property  generally  oppose  
developing  countries  and  developed  countries  (see  Reichman  1997  for 
example).  For  an  economic  analysis  of  the  international  protection  of 
intellectual  property  when  trade  between  the  North  and  the  South  is 
considered  see Grossman  and  Laie (2004).
5point  of view that  both  parties  were satisfied  with  the  outcome  of 
the dispute  on GIs.
An   important   part   of   the   Panel   report   deals   with   national  
treatment.  National treatment  in the context  of this dispute  means  
that  within  the  EC a foreign  GI producer  should  be  accorded  by 
the  EC Regulation  a treatment  no  less  favourable  than  the  one  
accorded   to   EC  nationals.   From   a   positive   point   of   view,   the  
national   treatment   compliance   allows   a   Member   to   develop  
internal  regulations  that  are not  protectionist 9. National  treatment  
in   particular   ensures   that   the   access   to   a   particular   domestic  
market   for   a   foreign   producer   is   not   made   conditional   to   a 
particular  internal  regulation  choice  of  his  government.  Another  
important  part  of the Panel report  deals  with  GIs coexistence  with  
similar  pre- existing  trademarks.  The  compatibility  of  two  broad  
models  for  protecting  intellectual  property  rights  for  agricultural  
products  is therefore  questioned.
The   aim   of   this   paper   is  twofold.   First,   it   shows   that   the  
international  harmonisation  of rules  for GIs protection  is at stake  
on  both  aspects  of this  dispute  (national  treatment  and  GIs and  
prior  identical  trademarks  compatibility). The paper  then  tries  to 
characterise  the  future  of GIs as  a model  of intellectual  property  
rights   for   agricultural   products.   The   paper   is   structured   as 
follows.  In the  second  section  the  main  conclusions  of the  Panel 
report  are  analysed.  With the  help  of this  analysis  a study  of the 
international   harmonisation   of   rules   on   GIs   protection   is 
presented  in the  third  section.  This  study  permits  to characterise  
the position  of the parties  after  the dispute  on GIs.
9 See Roessler  (1999) on that  point.
62. The report of the Panel
The two  main  issues  of the  Panel report  considering  national  treatment  
and  prior  trademark  and  GIs coexistence  are successively considered.
2.1. The national treatment
The  claims  of  the  United   States  regarding  national  treatment   in  the  
dispute   on   GIs   concern   five   different   issues:   availability   of   protection,  
application   procedures,   objection   procedures,   inspection   structures   and  
labelling   requirement.   In   each   case,   the   United   States   argue   that   national  
treatment  obligations  under  article  3:1 of TRIPS agreement  and  under  article 
III:4 of GATT 1994  are violated  by dispositions  of the European  regulation.
The national  treatment  principle  is defined  as following  in article 3:1 of 
TRIPS   agreement:   “Each   Member   shall   accord   to   the   nationals   of   other  
Members  treatment  no less favourable  than  that  it accords  to its own nationals  
with  regard  to  the  protection  of intellectual  property”.  This  article  applies  to 
nationals  rather  than  to  products.  Under  article  III:4 of GATT 1994,  national  
treatment   applies   to   products.   However,   the   Panel   will   reach   the   same  
conclusions  concerning  the  respect  of the  national  treatment  by the  European  
regulation  when  considering  the  definition  of the  TRIPS agreement  and  when  
considering  the  definition  of  the  GATT 1994  agreement.  The  present  article 
focuses  rather  on the debates  raised  by article 3:1 of TRIPS agreement.
Since individual  rather  than  products  are concerned  with this article, the  
Panel   has   to   evaluate   if   "effective   equality   of   opportunities"   between   the  
nationals  of  other  Members  and  the  European  Communities'  own  nationals  
with  respect  to  the  protection  of  GIs  is  granted  by  the  disposition  of  the  
European   regulation.   If   the   protection   of   GIs   for   the   nationals   of   other  
Members  is lesser  than  the  protection  of GI’s of the  European  Communities’ 
nationals,  national  treatment   will   be   scorned  and  the  European   regulation  
judged  as inconsistent  with the WTO’s rules. The different  claims  of the United  
States  and  their consideration  by the Panel are considered  in what  follows.
2.1.1 Availability  of protection
7The   procedures   for   applications   for   registration   of   GIs   are   strictly 
controlled  by  the  European  regulation.  These  procedures  are  essential  since 
GIs’ protection  needs  GIs’ registration  as  a preliminary.  Nationals  from  other  
Members  whishing  to have  the  benefit  of the  GIs’ protection  should  therefore  
be  able  to  register  their  GIs. In the  European  regulation,  the  procedures  for 
application  for registration  of GIs located  on the  European  territory  (articles  5 
to  7) are  distinct  from  the  procedures  for  application  for  registration  of GIs 
located  outside  the  European  territory  (articles  12bis and  12ter). This  formal  
difference  in treatment  is not  sufficient  to  show  a violation  of the  "effective 
equality  of opportunities" principle. Such a violation  will be found  however  by 
the Panel in the dispositions  of article 12:1 that  form  preliminary  requirements  
to article 12bis  and  12ter  for registration  of GI’s located  outside  the  European  
territory 10.
Article   12:1   indeed   makes   the   registration   of   non   European   GIs 
conditional  to   the  presence  in   the  foreign  country   of  a  regulation  on   GIs 
protection   similar   to   the   European   one.   This   harmonisation   attempt   is 
constraining  since,  on  the  one  hand,  many  countries  (the  United  States  in 
particular)  do  not  have  such  a regulation  and,  on the  other  hand,  a particular  
Member   cannot   make   GIs   protection   conditional   to   such   a   condition   of 
equivalence.   This   preliminary   condition   goes   against   "effective   equality   of 
opportunities"   between   the   nationals   of   other   Members   and   the   European  
Communities'  own nationals.
The   EC  defend   their   position  arguing   that   the   expression   “without  
prejudice  to  international  agreements”  in article  12:1  subjects  the  conditions  
of article 12:1 to the  terms  of the  GATT 1994  and  of the  TRIPS agreements.  In 
other  words,  WTO Members  should  not  be concerned  with  the  restrictions  of 
article 12:1 when  applying  for their  GIs registration  in the EC. The Panel points  
10  Article 12(1)   provides   as   follows:   Without   prejudice   to   international  
agreements,  this  Regulation  may  apply  to an  agricultural  product  or foodstuff  
from  a third  country  provided  that:
-  the  third  country  is able to give guarantees  identical  or equivalent  to those  referred  
to in Article 4,
-  the  third  country  concerned  has  inspection  arrangements  and  a right  to  objection  
equivalent  to those  laid down  in this  Regulation,
-   the   third   country   concerned   is   prepared   to   provide   protection  
equivalent   to   that   available   in   the   Community   to   corresponding  
agricultural  products  or foodstuffs  coming  from  the Community."  
8out  however  that  no  registration  procedure  for  GIs’ protection  exists  in  the 
GATT   1994   and   the   TRIPS  agreements.   As   a   consequence,   the   expression  
“without  prejudice  to  international  agreements”  does  not  protect  a Member  
from  the  exigencies  of article 12:1. Therefore,  the  requirement  of a regulation  
on  GIs protection  similar  to  the  European  one  is incompatible  with  national  
treatment  for the Panel.
2.1.2 Application  procedures  and objection  procedures
The  application  procedure  for  GIs  located  in  the   EC is  described  in 
article 5 of the European  regulation.  The application  is scheduled  to be sent  to 
the  Member  State  in which  the  geographical  area  is located.  Then, the  Member  
State  verifies  that  the  application  is justified  and  forwards  it to the  European  
Commission.  The  procedures  for  application  for  registration  of  GIs located  
outside  the  European  territory  is described  in article  12bis. This  article  states  
that  the  application  for  registration  shall  be  sent  to  the  authorities  in  the 
country  in which  the  geographical  area  is located.  If these  authorities  consider  
that  the application  satisfies  the requirements  of the European  regulation,  they  
can transmit  it to the  European  Commission  accompanied  by, among  others,  a 
description  of  the  domestic  regulation  on  GIs’ protection.  For  the  EC this  
cooperation  of the  foreign  country  is seen  as  essential  for  ensuring  that  the  
concerned   GI   is   produced   in   accordance   to   product   specifications   and  
inspection.
In front  of  these  specifications  the  Panel  concludes  that  the  European  
regulation  gives other  WTO Member  nationals  less favourable  treatment  than  it 
gives to the European  Communities'  own nationals. Indeed, the Panel considers  
that  EC Member  States  are  obliged,  with  regard  to  EC law,  to  forward  any 
admissible   GI   application   for   registration   to   the   European   Commission,  
whereas  a third  country  only complies  voluntarily. Furthermore  a third  country  
should  not  be  required  to  know  the  European  regulation  and  to  be  able  to 
judge   if   its   own   legislation   responds   to   the   dispositions   of   the   European  
regulation. 
With  the  same  line  of reasoning   the  Panel  shows  that  the  nationals  of 
other  Members  are accorded  "less  favourable" treatment  than  nationals  of the  
9EC with regard  to objection  procedures.  A national  from  third  country  wishing  
to object  under  the  European  regulation  to registration  of GIs have  to send  a 
statement  to  the  country  in  which  it resides,  which  shall  transmit  it to  the  
European  Commission.  Nationals  of other  Members  face  an  "extra  hurdle"  in 
ensuring   that   the   authorities   in   those   countries   carry   out   the   functions  
reserved  to them  under  the  European  regulation,  which  nationals  of the  EC do 
not face 11.
2.1.3 Inspection  structures
Article   4   of   the   European   regulation  makes   the   compliance   with   a 
product  specification  a prerequisite  to  GIs. This  product  specification  has  to 
identify,   among   others,   the   product   characteristics   and   the   inspection  
structures 12. These  inspection  structures  are  seen  as  mean  to ensure  that  the 
different   elements   of   the   product   specification   are   met.   In   the   European  
regulation  spirit  this  is considered  as  a way  to  ensure  that  the  information  
delivered  to  consumers  by GIs is true.  In order  to  register  GIs of national  of 
other  Members,  the  European  regulation  (article  12bis) asks  the  authorities  of 
those  Members  to  ensure  that  equivalent  inspection  structures  exist  in their  
territory.
The  United   States  consider  that  this  inspection  structure  requirement  
violates  national  treatment  obligations.  Nationals  from  the  EC automatically 
have the required  inspection  structures  which other  WTO Member  nationals  do 
not. The United  States  argue  that  if a product  meets  basic standards  for  what  
constitutes  a GI for  the  EC, the  non- EC national  should  be able  to  register  it 
under  the  European  regulation,  regardless  of  whether  its  home  government  
has  established  the  same  inspection  structures  as the EC member  States 13. The 
requirement   of   inspection   structures   identical   to   the   European   ones   as   a 
precondition  for  granting  intellectual  property  rights   to  nationals  of  other  
Members  would  entail less favourable  treatment.
11 Report  of the Panel, paragraph  7.341.
12 The inspection  structures  are described  in article 10 of the  European  
Regulation.
13 Report  of the Panel, paragraph  7.392.
10The   Panel   considers   that   the   United   States   did   not   succeed   in 
demonstrating  that  the  inspection  structures  requirement  is burdensome  and  
likely to  raise  an  obstacle  to  "effective  equality  of opportunities"  between  EC 
and   non- EC   nationals.   The   European   requirement   is   on   the   contrary  
considered  as  flexible: authorities  as  well as  approved  private  bodies  can  be 
considered,  a private  bodies  can have other  kind  of activities  together  with the 
control   and,   finally,   the   applicable   standards   for   private   bodies   can   be   a 
standard  equivalent  to  the  European  one 14  (ISO standard  for  example) 15. The 
intended  participation  of third  countries’  authorities  in inspection  structures  
(articles  10 and  12bis of the European  regulation) is considered  however  by the  
Panel  as  incompatible  with  article  3:1 of the  TRIPS agreement.  The  reasoning  
used  by  the  Panel  to  reach  that  conclusion  is the  same  as  the  one  used  to 
evaluate  authorities’ participation  in application  and  objection  procedures.
2.1.4. Labelling  requirement
The   complaint   by   the   United   States   concerns   here   the   case   of 
homonymous   GIs.   In   their   argumentation   a   formal   treatment   difference  
between   nationals   from   the   EC  and   non- EC  nationals   is   pointed   out:   the  
registration   conditions   of   homonymous   GIs   from   the   EC  is   considered   in 
article 6.6 of the  European  Regulation  whereas  the  registration  conditions  of a 
non- EC GI with  a homonymous  prior  registered  GI from  the  EC is considered  
in article  12:2.  The  United  States  consider  that  a cost  supported  by non  EC 
nationals  results  in this  formal  difference.  Indeed  for the  United  States  article 
12:2  requires  that  the  country  of origin  of the  product  is clearly  and  visibly 
indicated  on  the  label  of  the  foreign  product  in  case  of  homonymous  GIs 
whereas  article  6.6 does  not  impose  such  a requirement  for  GIs from  the  EC. 
This  mention  would  generate  a reduction  of  the  value  of  the  concerned  GI 
insofar  as it would  induce  the  idea that  this  GI is different  from  the  “true  GI”. 
This result  of course  would  be incompatible  with national  treatment.
For the EC, the difference  between  the two articles 6:6 and  12:2 has  to be 
seen  in  their  respective  field  of  application.  Article  6  applies  to  a  broader  
range   of   homonymous   GIs:  homonymous   GIs   located   in   different   Member  
14 Standard  EN 45011
15 Report  of the Panel, paragraph  7.387.
11States  of the  EC as  well as  a GI from  the  EC which  is a homonym  of a third  
country  GI. The EC consider  that  the messages  of the two articles  are identical. 
In practice, in order  to make  a clear distinction  of the homonymous  GIs, the GI 
which is registered  later, whatever  its origin, is required  to indicate  the country  
of  origin.  The  national  treatment  claim  on  that  point  should  therefore  be 
dismissed.  Doing an analysis  of the syntax  of the two articles  the Panel retains  
the interpretation  of the EC.
2.2 The relationship  between  GIs and prior trademarks
The  United  States  claim  that  the  possibility  of coexistence  between  GIs 
and  prior  identical trademarks  scheduled  by the  European  regulation  infringes  
exclusive   rights   of   the   trademark   owners   under   article   16:1   of   the   TRIPS 
agreement.  Before  analysing  the  argumentation  of the  parties  on  that  point  it 
is important  to remind  the  general  context  of the  dispute  on  the  relationship  
between  GIs and  prior  trademark.
For the EC, organising  the coexistence  between  GIs and  trademarks  is an 
imperative.  The collective  right  delivered  to GIs holders  to prevent  the  use  of 
the  registered  name  can  however  contradict  the  private  right  of  trademarks  
owners   to   do   the   same.   In   practical   terms,   the   European   regulation   has  
therefore  to balance  these  two distinct  interests.  On the  one hand,  trademarks  
owners  invest  a lot  to  make  known  their  products,  to  create  and  to  ensure  
consumers’  confidence.  On the  other  hand,  GIs owners  are  obliged  to comply 
with  precise  product  specifications  ensuring  product  differentiation.  In both  
cases, the economic  stakes  involved  are important.
The United  States  attach  little importance  to GIs and  don’t have specific 
protection  rules  for GIs as a consequence.  The legislation  of the  United  States, 
in opposition,  gives ascendancy  to trademarks.  According  to this, some  of the  
American   practitioners   consider   that   the   trademarks   rights   are   not   well 
represented  compared  to GIs rights  in the TRIPS agreement 16.
These  divergences  of valorisation  policies  for  agricultural  products  are 
one  of the  reasons  of this  dispute  and  explain  the  respective  position  of the  
16 C.W. LACKERT, « Indications  géographiques  : quelles  obligations  en vertu  de l'accord  ADPIC ? », 
PIBD n° 665,II, p 201.
12parties.   The   United   States   alleged   that   the   article   14:2   of   the   European  
Regulation   organising   the   coexistence   between   GIs   and   similar   prior  
trademarks  undermines  intellectual  property  rights  of trademarks  owners. The 
article   16   of   the  TRIPS  Agreement   enounces  indeed  that   “the  owner  of   a 
registered  trademark  shall have the  executive  right  to prevent  all third  parties  
not  having  the  owner’s  consent  from  using  in the  course  of trade  identical  or 
similar  signs  for  goods  or  services  which  are  identical  or  similar  to  those  in 
respect  of which  the  trademark  is registered  where  such  use  would  result  in a 
likelihood  of confusion”.  In front  of this  position,  the  EC put  forward  several  
arguments  to defend  the  European  Regulation.  The Panel only agreed  with  one  
of them 17.
The Panel considers  that  the  coexistence  between  a prior  trademark  and  
a GI form  a limited  exception  to the  exclusive rights  of trademarks  owners,  as 
expressed  in the  article  17  of the  TRIPS Agreement 18. The  article  14:2  of the 
European  Regulation  takes  into  account  the  legitimate  interests  of the  owner  
of the  trademark  and  of third  parties  (consumers  and  any persons  using  a GI 
in   accordance   with   its   registration).   In   practical   terms,   this   means   that  
trademark  owners  suffer  a limitation  of their  rights  in particular  cases  only. 
Consumers  can use  GIs to verify that  the  concerned  products  effectively come  
from  precise  geographical areas  and  possess  qualities  linked  to their  territorial  
origins.  The  GIs producers  see  their  qualitative  efforts  settled  with  product  
specifications  rewarded  by a differentiation  of their products.
Such  a solution  is not  surprising  and  can  be considered  to  get  the  two 
parties  satisfied.  On the  one  hand,  the  European  Regulation  is not  modified  in 
substance  about  trademarks  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  coexistence  between  
17  For   the   EC  several   arguments   can   be   put   forward   to   justify   the  
coexistence  between  prior  trademarks  and  GI’s. First, the  article 14:3 of 
the   European   Regulation   avoids   confusions   since   it   prohibits   the 
registration  of any  GI identical  to  a “well- known”  trademark.  Second,  
the  coexistence  of GIs with  trademarks  is organised  by the  article  24:5 
of   the  TRIPS Agreement.  Third,  diminishing  protection  for  GIs   pre-
existing  to the  TRIPS Agreement  is prohibited  by the  article 24:3 of this  
agreement.  The EC consider  therefore  that  they  are obliged  to maintain  
coexistence  between  prior  trademarks  and  GIs. Fourth,  in the  article 17 
of the  TRIPS Agreement,  the  possibility to depart  from  the principles  of 
the article 16 is anticipated.  This derogation  allows  the EC to justify the  
coexistence  between  trademarks  and  GIs. The  Panel  agreed  with  this  
latter  argument  only.
18 Report  of the Panel, para. 7.688.
13prior   trademarks   and   GIs   is   strictly   delimited   and   does   not   question   the  
American  model  of trademarks  protection.
143. The analysis  of the dispute
This commercial dispute  on GIs is interesting  from  many  points  of view. 
First of all the fact that  the EC were satisfied  with the Panel’s decision  whereas  
the   European   regulation   has   to   be   changed   on   many   aspects   has   to   be 
explained  (2.1). Furthermore,  this  dispute  reveals  the originality formed  by GIs 
as  intellectual  property  elements  (2.2). Finally, the  dispute  puts  light  on  the  
debate  on  international  harmonisation  of  the  rules  on  intellectual  property  
protection  (2.3).
3.1 Product  specifications  and inspection  structures  as key  points
For the  EC, seeing  the  European  regulation  spoiled  was  the  main  risk  of 
this  dispute.  This  risk  directly  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  TRIPS agreement  
tells few things  on the protection  of GIs. From  this point  of view, the allegation  
of   the   US  against   inspection   structures   was   obviously   the   most   sensible. 
Indeed,  to demand  for  GIs’ registration  that  products  specifications  verify the 
existence   of   inspection   structure   forms   the   cornerstone   of   the   European  
system   of   GI  protection.   This   requirement   ensures   the   credibility   of   the  
product  specifications.  This  element  is of  uppermost  importance  since  it is 
through   its   product   specifications   that   a   GI  is   defined   in   the   European  
regulation 19. Withdrawing  the exigency of inspection  structure  would  imply the 
total collapse  of the European  system.
In the  debates  of this  dispute,  the  US asked  why, rather  than  inspection  
structures,  unfair  competition  rules  could  not  constitute  the adequate  mean  to 
ensure  the  GIs protection.  The EC replied  that  such  a scheme  would  guarantee  
lesser  protection.  They more  specifically argued  that  “a producer  would  have 
to have  recourse  to legal action  and  could  not  rely on  controls  carried  out  by 
an inspection  body” and  that  a consumer  “would  only have the  assurance  that  
a competitor  might  take  legal action  against  non- conforming  products”  to be 
sure  of superior  product  quality 20. Obviously, the  EC desire  to avoid a scenario  
à   la   Shapiro   (1983)   in   which   the   goods’   quality   is   ensured   only   with   the 
19  The   Parmigiano   Reggiano   example   given   in   annex   2   is   a   good  
illustration  of this  point.
20 Report  of the Panel, para. 7.396.
15producer’s  reputation  (that  has  to  be  constructed  without  any  certification  
scheme). This debate  on inspection  structures,  therefore,  interestingly  focuses  
on  legal  governance  for  GIs protection.  This  orientation  was  inevitable  in  a 
situation,  on  the  one  hand,  characterised  by an  international  diversity  of GIs 
protection  systems  and,  on the  other  hand,  where  the  TRIPS agreement  is not  
very  constraining  in terms  of harmonisation,  simply  requiring  that  Members  
provide  legal means  for GIs protection.
Considering  the inspections  structures  as non - constraining, as the Panel 
did,  has  an  important  consequence.  Indeed,  the  GI of a non- EC Member  that  
would  satisfy  all the  European  requirements  defining  a GI, excepted  for  the 
requirement  on inspection  structure,  cannot  be registered  under  the  European  
Regulation.  It can  be argued  therefore  that  both  geographical  origin  and  legal 
means  of   protection   contribute   to   the   definition   of   a   GI  in   the  European  
perspective.  In front  of this  result,  it remains  however  that  claiming  for  non-
EC Members’  government  to  control  the  existence  of  inspection  structure  is 
seen  by the  Panel  as  incompatible  with  the  national  treatment  principle.  The 
European  Commission  should  therefore  be responsible  for this control.
3.2 The originality  of the GIs as elements  of intellectual property
Intellectual  property  protection  is  usually  justified  on  the  ground  of 
society’s  well- being  maximisation.  The  protection  of R&D’s outcomes  creates  
incentives   to   innovate.   Innovation   in   that   perspective   is   considered   to   be 
beneficial to consumers.  A decrease  in the market  size appears  however  due  to 
the   possibility   to   charge   a   price   higher   than   the   marginal   cost   as   a 
consequence  of protection.  A loss  of earnings  in term  of well being  appears  
therefore.  Society’s well- being should  however  increase  if this  loss  of earnings  
is smaller  than  the  increase  in well- being  created.  This  kind  of discourse  has  
penetrated  national  legislations  on the intellectual  property  protection.
When   GIs   are   considered   as   intellectual   property   elements,   this 
discourse  is no more  appropriate.  Since no innovation  is at stake  with GIs, it is 
necessary   to   put   forward   an   other   justification   for   protection.   This   latter  
underlines  that  increasing  in goods’  variety  raises  consumers’  well- being.  In 
situation   of   asymmetrical   information   on   goods’   quality   or   on   production  
16processes’ specifications,  goods  variety  tends  to decrease.  A protection  of GIs 
that  would  attest  to products’ specifications  can be considered  as a way to fill 
the   informational   gap.   The   desired   products   variety   would   therefore   be 
restored  as a consequence.  This protection  however  confers  a market  power  to 
producers  and  creates,  as  a result,  a well- being  transfer  from  the  consumers  
to  producers.  This  transfer  appears  as  the  necessary  “price  to  pay”  to  re-
establish  products  variety.
One has  to admit  that  this  latter  discourse  has  not  penetrated  national  
legislations  as  the  former  on  the  protection  of  R&D did.  The  countries  the 
more  receptive  to  it  should  be  those  for  which  history  is  determinant  for 
regional  alimentary  specificity.  In this  context  GIs have  a strong  significance  
since   good   quality   and   product   specificity   are   linked   with   traditional  
knowledge.  In response  to the  great  differences  among  countries  on that  field, 
a   great   diversity   in   the   legal   means   implemented   to   protect   GIs   can   be 
observed.   It   is   also   important   to   note   that   issues   of   an   agreement   on 
intellectual  property  protection  are  different  when  innovation  protection  is 
considered  rather  than  GIs protection.  When  innovation  protection  is at stake  
the  issue  of an  agreement  on  intellectual  property  protection  is primarily  to 
bring   closer   different   national   protection   systems.   When   GIs  protection  is 
considered  what’s primarily at stake  is rather  the recognition  of GIs as element  
of intellectual  property 21. This dispute  is really representative  of this situation.  
In this  context  and  from  a general  point  of view the  TRIPS agreement  aims  at 
creating  conditions  for  international  harmonisation  on  intellectual  property  
protection.  This  harmonisation  is  not  however  operated  with  the  help  of  a 
unique  system  that  would  be binding  at the international  level. As an example, 
the  section  3 of this  agreement  that  concerns  GIs specifically comprises  only 
three  elements:  a definition  of  a GI (article  22:1), the  request  addressed  to 
Members  for  the  implementation  of “legal means”  to protect  GIs (article 22:2) 
and  a clause  of “additional  protection” for GIs for wines  and  spirits  (article 23). 
It is interesting  to note  that  with  “legal means”  the  article 22:2 does  not  imply  
specific  regulations  on  GIs and  gives  Members  full  scope  in  their  choice  of 
rules. The TRIPS Council of the WTO noted  as a result  that  “countries  employ a 
21 See Mahé (1997) for example.
17wide  variety  of legal  means  to  protect  GIs: ranging  from  specific  GIs laws  to 
trademark  law, consumer  protection  law and  common  law”22. This declaration  
reveals  well the  difference  in “concernment”  towards  GIs that  coexists  among  
Members.
I   order   to   avoid  non   tariff   barriers   to   international   trade   due   to 
differences  in regulations,  safeguards  have  to be found.  National  treatment  is 
understood  in this  context.  This  principle  ensure  that  if a country,  noted  A, 
develops  a specific  regulation  in order  to  protect  intellectual  property  more  
stringent  than  the  one developed  by an other  country, noted  B, the  intellectual  
property  of B’s nationals  is protected  on A’s territory  as well as the intellectual  
property  of A’s own  nationals.  National  treatment  should  therefore  impede  a 
country  to use  its regulation  to the  sole purpose  of protecting  its nationals.  A 
more  positive  interpretation  can  be developed.  In this  interpretation,  national  
treatment  allows  the  country  A to develop  stringent  regulation  on intellectual  
property  protection  without  being  suspected  of delivering  more  protection  to 
intellectual  property  of its own nationals  at the expense  of foreign  nationals.
The   implications   of   national   treatment   are   different   however   when  
considering  GIs protection,  where  strong  gaps  between  national  legislations  
exist,   rather   than   innovation   protection   where   the   gaps   are   lesser.   As   an 
illustration   of   this   point,   imagine   that   in   the   country   B  of   the   preceding  
example   GIs   are   simply   recognized   as   elements   of   intellectual   property  
without  being  placed  under  a developed  protective  regulation  because  few GIs 
exist  on its territory  (for example,  the  products’  specifications  and  inspection  
structure  are  not  required,  primacy  is given  to  trademark  rather  than  to  GIs 
etc.). In the  country  A, on  the  contrary,  a developed  protective  regulation  is 
developed  for  GIs.  For  this   country  therefore,  fulfilling  national  treatment  
means  ensuring  high  protection  to  GIs from  foreign  countries  whereas  the  
same  treatment  from  foreign  countries  to  its  nationals  doesn’t  exist.  This 
result  appears  even if national  treatment  is applied  by the  country  B. It is only 
the  consequence  of the  gap  between  the  legislations  on  GIs protection  of the 
two countries.
3.3 The international  harmonisation  of regulations  and national treatment
22 www.wto.org  
18To  put   into   practice   national   treatment   with   respect   to   intellectual  
property  of  other  countries’  nationals,  a country  will ask  reciprocity  for  its 
nationals   to   the   foreign   country.   A  unilateral   implementation   of   national  
treatment  in a country  could  be  seen  indeed  as  a sort  of  altruism 23  since  it 
allows  foreign  nationals  to  have  the  advantage  of  the  GIs protection  in  its 
territory  whereas  this  advantage  is  not  accorded  to  its  nationals  abroad.  A 
mutual  respect  of national  treatment  will be therefore  sough- after. This shows  
that  a kind  of  international  harmonization  of  rules  (the  respect  of  national  
treatment)   is   necessary   for   protecting   intellectual   property 24.   This 
harmonisation  should  prevent  situations  where  the  regulation  chosen  by  a 
country   implies   a   positive,   but   not   reciprocal,   externality   on   the   other  
countries.
In the  dispute  on  GIs, the  European  regulation  is criticized  by the  US 
because  certain  procedures  for  non- EC nationals  are  made  conditional  to the  
existence  of regulation  similar  to the  European  one  in their  country  of origin, 
or  to  the  knowledge  by the  foreign  countries  of the  European  Regulation  on 
GIs.   This   European   position   can   be   interpreted   as   an   attempt   to   force  
international  harmonisation  of regulations  on GIs on the European  model, with  
the  aim  of guaranteeing  to the  GIs from  EC a high  degree  of protection  at an 
international  level. The Panel’s decision  shows  however  that  this unilateral  will 
of  harmonisation,   as  expressed  in   the  European  regulation,  is   opposed   to 
national  treatment.  
The  relation  existing  between  national  treatment  and  harmonisation  is 
therefore  ambiguous.   The   implementation   of   national   treatment   requires  
reciprocity.  This  reciprocity  can  be reached  with  the  help  of an  international  
agreement  on  intellectual  property  protection  like  the  TRIPS agreement,  and  
implies   a   degree   of   harmonisation   as   a   consequence.   However   a   mutual  
acceptance  of national  treatment  does  not  imply harmonisation  of the national  
regulations.  The dispute  on  GIs shows  that  it is quite  the  reverse  that  occurs  
since  national  treatment  has  the  effect  of restraining  unilateral  intentions  to 
push  upward  harmonisation  of national  regulations.
23 See Scotchmer  (2004).
24 For a general  analysis  of the  reasons  and  forms  of the  international  
harmonisation  of national  regulations  see Bhagwati (1997).
19As  illustrated  by  the  dispute  on  GIs, this  characteristic  will be  more  
constraining   for   a   country   having   a   regulation   on   intellectual   property  
protection  well  developed  and  confronted  with  countries  that  do  not.  What 
could   expect   the   country   A  for   its   nationals   from   B’s  implementation   of 
national   treatment?   Since   the   protection   of   GIs   in   the   country   B   is 
underdeveloped  the  answer  is straightforward.  Furthermore  this  example  can 
be  used  to  show  that  the  regulation  developed  by  the  country  A creates  a 
positive  cross- border  externality  on  the  country  B through  three  modes 25. 
First, consumers  of the country  B benefit  from  the  variety of products  allowed  
by  the  regulation  implemented  in  the  country  A. Second,  producers  of  GIs 
from  the  country  B can  be protected  under  the  regulation  of country  A since  
national   treatment   is   acknowledged   by   both   countries 26.  Finally,   since   GIs 
protection  is less  developed  in country  B, the  nationals  of the  country  B can 
more  easily compete  with  nationals  of the  country  A on  country  B’s markets.  
This positive externality  is not  reciprocal  of course,  even is national  treatment  
is   implemented   by   the   country   B.  Moreover   one   could   note   that   a   strict  
interpretation  of national  treatment  will raise  the  positive  externality  via the 
second  mode.  In the  same  perspective  it  can  be  underlined  that  the  more  
important  is the  gap  between  the  two regulations  at stake  the  more  important  
will be the positive externality via the third  canal.
This  analysis  makes  clear  the  reason s of the  EC when  trying  to impose  
with  the  initial  form  of  the  European  regulation  the  harmonisation  of  the 
regulations  on GIs protection  of its trade  partners  on his own regulation.  This  
one   would   make   the   positive   cross- border   externality   reciprocal.   On   the 
contrary, from  the point  of view of the United  States, or of other  countries  that  
do  not  have  developed  regulations  on GIs protection,  it is rational  on the  one 
hand  to keep  watch  over a strict  enforcement  of national  treatment,  and  on the  
other  hand,  to  free  ride  on  GIs protection  refusing  upward  harmonisation.  
25  Cross- border  externalities’ internalisation  is usually  conceived  as  a 
way   of   defending   the   necessity   of   multilateral   negotiations   for 
regulations  harmonisation.  See for example  Maskus  (2002).
26  A better  protection  of  GIs offered  in  a  country  will  not  imply  an 
international  delocalisation  of production  activities  contrary  to the  case 
of innovation  protection  (see Hall 2001  for example  for the latter  case).
20Without  penalizing  their  domestic  consumers,  they  have  two  control  levers  
allowing them  to benefit  from  the European  positive externality.
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